Bryan Singer’s *X-Men* (2000), based on the comic strip by Stan Lee, is populated with mutants: Sabretooth has the teeth of a tiger, Mystique is a human chameleon, Wolverine is a man with steel claws who can heal himself, Rogue is a girl who can absorb the memory and power of somebody else, Xavier can read minds, and Magneto is a human magnet. Contemporary audiovisual culture is flooded with a teratologic imaginary. Horror and science fiction genres in cinema have gained in popularity and moved from more obscure B-genres to mainstream cinema: vampires, replicants, zombies, and mutants of all sorts have become common features.

In her article “Teratologies,” Rosi Braidotti argues that a culture that is in the grip of such a techno-teratologic imaginary is in need of Deleuze’s philosophy: “The proliferation of a monstrous social imaginary calls for adequate forms of analysis. More particularly, it calls for a form of philosophical teratology which Deleuze is in a unique position to provide.”1 Braidotti argues that Deleuze’s philosophy can explain the fascination for monstrous images. Also, it can provide an antidote against the nostalgic and nihilistic position that the inflation of monstrous images is a sign of cultural decadence of our times and the decline of “master narratives” or the loss of the great canon of “high culture.” Like in *X-Men*, the humans consider the mutants dangerous and to be protected from, and monstrosity in general is seen as something terrifying and threatening to human identity. Deleuze provides the tools to construct more flexible forms of identity and subjectivity, grounded in “matter” and “memory” but never fixed.

Logic of Sensations in Becoming-Animal
In Chapter 2, I discussed the monstrous image of the flesh and how in psychoanalysis this is connected to the feminine and the abject as a borderline concept, between self and other, inside and outside, man and woman, human and machine, human and animal. I also discussed how images of the flesh can be conceived differently, as material or temporal aspects of subjectivity in movement-images or time-images, depending on the assemblages of which the image is part. In this chapter, I look at another way to conceive subjectivity through the imagination that is at work in audiovisual culture. As Braidotti argues, imagination is “a transformative force that propels multiple, heterogeneous ‘becomings’ or repositioning of the subject. The process of becoming is collectively driven, that is to say, relational and external; it is also framed by affectivity or desire and is thus eccentric to rational control. The notion of ‘figures’ [term modified]—in contrast to the representational function of ‘metaphors’—emerges as crucial to Deleuze’s notion of a conceptually charged use of imagination.” I look specifically at all kinds of narratives and figures of becoming-animal to find out how Deleuze’s concepts and those he developed together with Guattari can provide an adequate analysis of contemporary audiovisual culture inasmuch as it is occupied with a teratologic imaginary. I also attempt to discover how these concepts can form and transform our self-image, which seems to be in need of a “becoming-minoritarian” of everybody. A “logic of sensations” and affection-images seem important to express and sense the passive and active affects that are involved in becoming-animal.

Stories, Sensations, and Affection-Images

*Animals: Series, Structures, and Beyond*

To discover how becoming-animal might be understood, it is useful to have a look at some old stories about the relation between humankind and animals. I limit myself to some nineteenth-century novels and some of their (many) cinematic versions. A general characteristic of all horror creatures that “become-animal” is that they are always considered monsters. As I argued in Chapter 2, the incapacity of the traditional subject to think in terms of the in-between status (characteristic of all becomings) has evoked a feeling of those monsters’ abjection. In addition, almost all traditional
monsters are seen mostly seen as metaphors or archetypes for certain forms of human behavior.

Long before any written accounts existed, the vampire occupied the imagination of humankind. In old traditions, vampires were known to be dead humans who returned from the grave and attacked and sucked blood from the living as a means of sustaining themselves. They were associated with demonic beings, black magic, and other supernatural powers. It was Bram Stoker, in his 1897 novel *Dracula*, who presented the modern version of the vampire. Drawing on Transylvanian and Rumanian myths and the history of Count Vlad Dracul, Stoker charged his vampire, Count Dracula, with symbolism. The vampire is equipped with a pair of fangs to symbolize its bloodsucking instinct, the coffin as its bed symbolizes its relationship with death, and finally the vampire also becomes associated with the bat (the cape and Dracula’s capacity to transform into a bat: the only flying and bloodsucking animal that is, like humans, a mammal). It is an impossible task to give an account of all the variations of the vampire myth. Hundreds of books, comics, films, fan clubs, and Internet news groups share a fascination for vampires. Stoker’s book has been visualized many times. The best-known films are *Nosferatu, Eine Symphonie des Grauens* (Murnau, 1922), *Dracula* (Browning, 1931), *Nosferatu, Phantom der Nacht* (Herzog, 1979) and *Bram Stoker’s Dracula* (Coppola, 1992).

Because of their high degree of symbolism and metaphor, these stories and films serve an important purpose in representing a collective imaginary. Deleuze and Guattari explain in *A Thousand Plateaus* that there are two methods of natural history to classify the relations between animals and between man and animal (man and woman, man and child, in short: man and “inappropriate/other”). According to Deleuze and Guattari, classification occurs either through series or through structures but mostly through a combination of the two (much to the annoyance of Lévi-Strauss, who preferred pure structures). Series work with Jungian archetypes, with each term representing a transformation of the libido, the unconscious lust principle. They operate on the level of dreams and imaginations and are metamorphoses. In this way, a human can turn into a bat because there is a resemblance between the vampire bat (which lives by night, can fly, and sucks blood) and the human vampire (who lives by night, can fly, sucks blood, and can transform into a bat). Bela Lugosi, with his strong sexual attraction to his victims, is the ultimate example of this serial vampire.
structural relations between human and animal work on a conceptual level and are represented by metaphors: the vampire is to humans as the bat is to animals. All these kinds of relations are based on resemblance, imitation, or maybe even identification.

Whatever the importance of these serial and structural relations between man and animal, there is yet another relation between the two: that of becoming-animal. Becoming-animal has its own reality, which is not based on resemblance or affiliation but on alliance, symbiosis, affection, and infection. Deleuze and Guattari say it in the following way:

Does it not seem that...there is still room for something else, something more secret, more subterranean: the sorcerer and becomings (expressed in tales instead of myths or rites)? . . . Becomings-animal are neither dreams nor fantasies. They are perfectly real... . . . What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposed fixed terms through which that becoming passes. . . . The becoming-animal of the human being is real, even if the animal the human being becomes is not; and the becoming-other of the animal is real, even if that something other it becomes is not. . . . Becoming is always of a different order than filiation. It concerns alliance . . . in the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation.8

According to Deleuze and Guattari, there exists a reality of becoming-animal that consists of a proximity between man and animal on the level of affects, movements, and speeds. This means that becoming-animal is based on the affinity of certain affects. In other words, becoming-animal is a way of creating a Body without Organs (BwO). It is on the level of intensities that the assemblage animal-human is made. It is not evoked by blood ties or heritage but by contagion and infection. From this point of view, vampires also can express a reality of becoming because they can pick and choose any other person to make a vampire as well. More specifically about vampires and werewolves, Deleuze and Guattari say:

Man does not become wolf, or vampire, as if he changed molar species; the vampire and werewolf are becomings of man, in other words, proximities between molecules in composition, relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between emitted particles. Of course there are werewolves and vampires, we say this with all our heart; but do not look for a resemblance or analogy to the animal, for this is becoming-animal in action, the production of molecular animal (whereas the "real" animal is trapped in its molar form and subjectivity).9
Deleuze and Guattari thus acknowledge the existence of real becoming-animals in vampires and other monstrous figures. In the history of cinema, however, Dracula and his mates often rely on heavy sexual symbolism and metaphors (and changing of molar species) and therefore belong more to the serial and structural relations between man and animal. Maybe Dracula’s popular successors Lestat de Lioncourt and the sensitive vampire Louis from Ann Rice’s novel *Interview with the Vampire* get closer to the becoming-animal.\(^{10}\) In the first instance, this could be due to the fact that in Rice’s version much of the symbolism is no longer valuable for these vampires: they can stand garlic, they do not need to sleep in coffins, and they can even tolerate light, albeit artificial light such as a sunset on celluloid. They are still nocturnal creatures and depend on blood, but they do not metamorphose into a bat. They are in a constant status of becoming (they are closer to a wolf than to a bat); Lestat and Louis have their own dynamics and affections. Out of affinity and affection, Louis makes a little girl Claudia into a vampire. Neil Jordan filmed Rice’s book, but I will not go into details of this film here.

Neil Jordan did, however, make another film, *The Company of Wolves*, based on a novel by Angela Carter, which will be discussed in one of the next sections. What vampires share with werewolves is that they “procreate” by contamination. Stories and legends of werewolves are also old and have been told over and again. I believe that, at least in some cinematic versions, these stories are closer to the becoming-animal than most of the vampire stories, but I return to this point later in this chapter.

*becoming-animal in affection-images*

Not all monsters of the nineteenth century (as well as before and after) are created by the mysterious, dark forces of nature. Another way to create new species or in-between species (“monsters”) is via the illuminated path of science and technology. Of the many stories of mad scientists and monsters, such as Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* and H. G. Wells’s *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, I will look more closely at the story of Dr. Jekyll. Stevenson’s novel *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* takes place in the prudish, narrow-minded Victorian era.\(^{11}\) It is the tragic story of a man, a doctor, who cannot cope with the tension between his hidden feelings of lust and sexual energy and the rules and regulations of society to which he, as a distinguished person,
is confined. He thinks he has found the solution to this problem by discovering a chemical that can separate good and bad. Of course, the bad takes over and must be destroyed: with the bad, the good then dies, too. The novel presents the events as a search after his death, which is different from most cinematic versions, which show what happens before our eyes. To get closer to the cinematic experience, I limit myself here to Rouben Mamoulian’s version *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1931).12

The first sequence of the film consists solely of the viewpoint of Dr. Jekyll. The only moment we get to see him is when he sees himself in the mirror while getting dressed. The rest of the images are rather shaky, with a lot of movement (the movements of Jekyll) and with vague black borders that end before the frame of the whole image ends. The movement of the images makes the viewer feel a bit dizzy, and the fact that the borders of the image are within the frame evokes a claustrophobic feeling: one has the impression that vision is seriously constrained and limited. In this purely visual way, Mamoulian expresses exactly Dr. Jekyll’s struggle, which he makes explicit in the next scene during one of his classes. The point of view has changed, and we see and hear Jekyll lecturing: “... We have set boundaries for our vision. As men of science we should be curious and bold enough to peel beyond them. . . .” In a Cartesian way, he goes on explicitly to separate body and soul/psyche by proclaiming that man is not one, but two: “One strives for nobility and is good, the other seeks the expression of life impulses that bind him to some animal relation with the earth, and is bad.” So he invents a chemical that allows him to separate his two internal forces.

In the visualizations of the transformations, there is one striking aspect: they all take place in close-ups or in Deleuzian terms in affection-images. One of the possible affection-images is the face (or the face-like).13 The close-up has the power to express a pure affect without any spatiotemporal relations, but the close-up paradoxically presents at the same time a face and its effacement: the individuation of each person/thing is diminished or even ended by a close-up.14 Now it seems to me that all these processes are at work in the expression of the becoming Mr. Hyde of Dr. Jekyll. There are many close-ups throughout the film. The first striking set of close-ups is near the beginning of the film, when Dr. Jekyll begs his fiancee, Muriel, to marry him soon because he can wait no longer (to have sexual intercourse). The sequence consists of several shot/counter-
shots, which become closer and closer. In the end, we see only Muriel’s
eyes, and we hear her voice saying, “I love you, I love you,” and Jekyll’s
eyes while we hear his words, “Who shall ever separate us then?” The an-
twer to this question is given immediately in the next image when a
shadow falls on the two lovers, now in embrace. They are requested to be-
have and go back to the party that is going on. Later we see a similar close-
up of the eyes, this time of Mr. Hyde, who is saying, “I love you, I love
you” to the prostitute Ivy. This shows the complete fusion and confusion
of both Jekyll and Hyde and Muriel and Ivy: there is no more space, no
more distance, a real conflation of body and space means that the individ-
uation ends and a process of becoming can start.

The face, which expresses affects in quality or power, is tangible in
the images of transformation. For instance, the second transformation con-
sists of five close-ups that show first the still wondering face of Jekyll and
then a close-up of his hand, expressing a first change, and back to the face,
which is on its way from quality to power. The next shot is another close-
up of the hand, which by now has started to grow hair; finally, we see the
powerful (but hideous because it is in binary opposition) face of Mr. Hyde.
Here the different close-ups are linked together (or interrupted) by the
editing process. Later in the film, on three occasions, in one close-up shot,
we see the change from quality to power (which can be positive, but here is
negative), from Jekyll to Hyde happening before our eyes. This is morph-
ing avant-la-lettre and shows the quality and power of cinema to make the
invisible visible, even if in an exaggerated way. In any case, this film shows
what is meant by the affection-image and how it can be employed for ex-
pressing the sensations of becoming-animal.

As is well known, it all ends disastrously. Dr. Jekyll cannot resist the
evil power of Mr. Hyde; he becomes a killer and has to be killed himself.
Jekyll shares with all his contemporaries the binary opposition that is be-
lieved to be fundamental for humankind: good—bad; man—woman
(woman is subdivided into virgin—whore); rich—poor. He is, however,
one of the few to admit that there is good and bad in everyone. He does
not want to repress the bad (here the animal); he wants to set it free (to get
rid of it) so that the good can be pure. The chemical he invents for doing
this works like a drug. At the end of this chapter, I elaborate on the rela-
tion between drugs and the becoming-animal. Now I will just remark that
the “drug” makes him feel good, but it makes him look bad and behave
badly. The final message of the film seems to be that one should repress “animal instincts” and stick to the rules and conventions; but the counter-message would be that rules and conventions should allow more room for free expression and affection, more room for becoming instead of being animal. The binary organization of Jekyll’s world does not allow for such becomings, however. Although the film shows some moments of becoming-animal, especially in the “depersonalizing” affection-image, in the end, Hyde is seen in a structural way, as a metaphor for the beast in man. If we discuss the film in terms of the tetravalence of the assemblage, it is obvious that the affection-image (form of content) gives us (literally) a corporeal modification. At the same time, something new happens on the level (form) of expression; an incorporeal transformation takes place in Dr. Jekyll’s mind. Mr. Hyde is Dr. Jekyll’s deterrioralizing “line of flight,” but in the end, the territorializing forces and binary oppositions of Victorian society are much stronger. Here is no place for becomings.

**Becoming-Animal in Painting: Senses and Color**

One of the most important aspects of becoming, and certainly of becoming-animal, is the sensation through which this becoming is felt: becoming creates new sensitivities. This also explains why it is precisely the affection-image that can take account of such becomings. The French writer Paul Valéry defined sensation as “that which is directly transmitted, without the ‘detour’ or the ‘boredom’ of a story to tell.” More positively, the painter Francis Bacon defines sensation as “that which shifts from one order to another, from one level to another.” This still rather vague definition might become clearer when we look at Bacon’s paintings, in which there is always some kind of deformation, mainly of bodies, going on. In other words, his painted figures and their surroundings do not belong to one specific level (neither “realistic” representation nor pure mental conceptualization). Because becoming-animal is so strongly expressed in Bacon’s work, it is useful to look at this artistic domain first, before we return to the cinematographic image.

In his book about Bacon, *Francis Bacon, Logique de la Sensation*, Gilles Deleuze explains how Bacon expresses sensation through the use of figures instead of figurations. Figuration (representative and narrative) and its absolute counterpart abstraction, work through mental operations
rather than directly on the nervous system; therefore, they do not operate through sensation. I would like to add that if sensation is felt in figurative and abstract works, this does not occur on the level of figuration or abstraction. Sensation works on an instinctual level; it is felt rather than thought.\textsuperscript{17} Because we have multiple senses, and because every sense questions each object in its own way, sensation (\textit{le sentir}) is always an intersensory and synesthetic experience.\textsuperscript{18} Deleuze formulates this synthetic and synesthetic combination of sensations as follows: "Between a color, a taste, a touch, a smell, a noise, a weight, there would be an existential communication that would constitute the ‘pathic’ (nonrepresentative) moment of the sensation.”\textsuperscript{19}

Deleuze mentions the painting of Isabel Rawsthorne to explain how Bacon makes this multisensoriality visible: it presents a head with ovals and lines that enlarge the eyes and also the nose and the mouth; the whole face is mobilized, all the senses are exercised at once. At the same time, all our senses as spectators are addressed at once. This power of the multisensual figure is a power (vital and affective) that Deleuze equally refers to as rhythm: “This force is Rhythm and is more profound than vision, audition, etc. Rhythm manifests itself as music when the auditory level is invested, as painting when the visual level is invested. A ‘logic of the senses’ that is not rational, not cerebral, said Cézanne.”\textsuperscript{20} Rhythm is not visible as such; sensation is vibration on a molecular level, and it can only be felt. One is \textit{moved} by invisible forces, by invisible movement brought to the surface by an artist. Of course, the question of rhythm can be related to the concept of becoming-music. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. Returning now to the “portrait” of Isabel Rawsthorne, one has the feeling that it is not the face of a woman but rather more like the head of some animal-like creature: a becoming-animal, which takes on some “monstrous” proportions. Animals have extremely well-developed (instinctual) senses, and it will be no surprise to discover that becoming-animal is closely related to the microperceptions of sensations.

Like every phenomenal body, every figure needs a space in which to be situated. Bacon always creates a flat surface and a contour (a ring, a circle, a rectangle, or a line) that encloses the figure. At the same time, the figure also transmits its invisible forces to the space.\textsuperscript{21} Every figure has its own place in relation to its environment (the surface and the contour); they are interrelated, influence each other, and together form an image. Because...
every sense has its own effects, it is quite possible that a space is not limited to just one dimension: this experience is expressed, made perceptible by Bacon’s paintings. Another well-known example is what happens to space when you listen with closed eyes to a concert: if you open your eyes after a while, you feel that the visible space is much smaller in relation to that other space that was created by the music.22 Even with open eyes, the clearly perceived space can be doubled with another, more mysterious space. From this example, it is clear that space is an experience, a construction of the senses, either in “real life” or as expressed by works of art.

In fact, this is precisely the function of works of art (be they avant garde or popular): to enclose spaces that would otherwise remain unknown, to which no one would have direct access. The interrelation between bodies (figures) and spaces takes place on the level of the surface. This does not mean that there is no depth. It only means that depth is not necessarily three dimensional. Rather, it is a reversibility of dimensions, a bidimensional proximity of figures and spaces. Deleuze says that both Cézanne and Bacon show this coexistence or proximity of dimensions: “Bacon remains faithful to Cézanne . . . especially in his treatment of colors, . . . in a coexistence or proximity modulated by color. And through the membrane of the contour, a double movement is made: a flat extension towards the frame and a voluminous contraction towards the body.”23 According to Deleuze, the major difference between Cézanne and Bacon seems to be the way their figures are deformed.24 This difference is due to the dissimilar forces that act on them (Cézanne’s world being open, Bacon’s world being closed). I will not elaborate this point further, however. Most important is the fact that both painters try to express directly what is at the source of sensations and what is perceptible only at the surface, which could be described as a contact surface, through a bundling together of different senses.25

As Deleuze already indicated, one of the most important means to achieve this sensational effect is through colors. Again, it is not a matter of resemblance or copying colors of nature. Each color has its own dimension, its own materiality and quality.26 Bacon and other colorists, such as Van Gogh and Gauguin, render space in pure colors. They can use black and white, light and dark as well, but in that case they use black and white as colors by opposing their tonality. Everything becomes dependent on the space–color distribution, which demands a haptic view rather than
Logic of Sensations in Becoming-Animal

an optic one. Colors are pure affect: they have their own independent quality and invisible movement.

From painting, we now move back to cinema. As Deleuze argued in *The Movement-Image* and discussed in Chapter 2, the qualities and potentialities of the affection-image are related not only to the close-up but also to the use of colors (shadows and light included) and to “any-space-whatevers.” Because the becoming-animal is closely related to the sensation of (mostly) invisible forces, it must be situated at the level of Peircian firstness, which is the form of expression of the affection-image. As mentioned in Chapter 2, firstness is the level that expresses something new in the experience; one could say that it is comparable to a first (instinctive) impression or, indeed, a sensation. Like sensation, firstness is difficult to define because it is felt rather than thought. It expresses qualities or powers that have value on their own merits (like the colors mentioned already) without any question of actualization. On this level, a possibility is expressed, and all is virtually contained in the affection-image. Therefore, I argue that becoming-animal as a deterritorializing force of the human subject finds its form of content and expression in the affection-image and Peircian firstness.

Becoming-Child Before Becoming-Animal

*Children Are Spinozists*

For children, every experience is new. Maybe it is for that reason that children have a conception of the world that is closer to the idea of becoming-animal. It might therefore be interesting to have another look at two stories that deal with children and animals to determine whether these provide additional insights. Rudyard Kipling’s *Jungle Book* has been told over and again, and “real” stories about wolf-children also have existed for ages. I analyze two cinematic wolf-children in this section, but first it might be useful to philosophize a little about the world of children. In the previous chapter, I took Alice in Wonderland as a figure of becoming-woman that expresses a “logic of sense” through paradoxes and nonsense. Now I want to see whether children are also close to a “logic of sensation” and a becoming-animal.

“Children are Spinozists,” say Deleuze and Guattari in *A Thousand Plateaus*. To understand this expression, it is necessary to go back to what

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was said before about Spinoza’s ethology. To recall briefly, it asserts that everything is essentially situated on the plane of immanence, on which “everything is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage depending on their connections, their relations of movement.”

This means that what distinguishes one thing or body from another is the different ways they distribute movements of speed and rest. I have discussed Deleuze’s example of Freud’s little Hans, who speaks about a *fait-pipi* (a “make wee-wee”). If you were to ask a boy whether a girl has a “make wee-wee,” he would answer “yes” because effectively girls do make wee-wee. What is important is not so much the organic function as the mechanical function. The difference is one of movement and rest (a girl does not have a pee standing, nor does she do this from a distance). A locomotive also has a “make wee-wee” in yet another mechanical agency. For children, an organ can take changeable forms, although these have nothing to do with psychoanalytic partial objects but everything to do with different relations of movement and rest, which Spinoza called “longitude.” The other axis of the body, the “latitude,” consists of powers and affects that are related to the longitude. Children have the natural instinct to look at organs in a mechanical, nonorganismic way, which makes them closer to the becoming-animal. We can see again here how greatly such a view on the case of little Hans differs from the Freudian interpretation and from Barbara Creed’s revision discussed in Chapter 2. As Deleuze and Guattari put it:

Once again, we turn to children. Note how they talk about animals, and are moved by them. They make lists of affects. Little Hans’ horse is not representative but affective. It is not a member of a species but an element or individual in a machinic assemblage: draft horse–omnibus–street. It is defined by a list of active and passive affects in the context of the individuated assemblage it is part of: having eyes blocked by blinders, having a bit and a bridle, being proud, having a big peepee-maker, pulling heavy loads, being whipped, falling, making a din with its legs, biting, etc. These affects circulate and are transformed within the assemblage: what a horse “can do”. . . . A horse falls down in the street! It can’t get back on its feet with that heavy load on its back, and the excessive whipping: a horse is going to die!—this was an ordinary sight in those days.

Hans is also taken up in an assemblage (the parental element, the house, the street, the right to go out on the street, the horse on the street). Might
there be a becoming-horse of Hans, an encounter or assemblage between the two? Certainly, the horse affects Hans, but the question is whether this is because the animal represents either the father or the mother.

Spinoza, on the other hand, considers childhood an unfortunate state of being because in childhood we depend too much on external causes. We suffer much more during childhood; our affects are much more passive because they are largely dependent on others (parents, siblings, friends, teachers). “Childhood,” says Spinoza, “is a state of impotence and slavery, a state of foolishness in which we depend in the highest degree on external causes and in which we necessarily have more of sadness than of joy; we are never more cut off from our power of action.” To be freed from this slavery, it is necessary to learn and to reason; but reason, according to Spinoza, is closely related to nature. On the one hand, the state of nature is not subject to the laws of reason: reason relates to the proper and true utility of man and tends solely to his preservation, the conatus mentioned before. Nature, on the other hand, has no regard for the preservation of man and comprises an infinity of other laws concerning the universe as a whole, of which man is but a small part. Reason, therefore, demands nothing contrary to nature. Reason demands only “that everyone should love themselves, seek what is useful to themselves, and strive to preserve their being by increasing their power of action. . . . Reason proceeds not by artifice, but by a natural combination of relations: it does not so much bring calculation, as a kind of direct recognition of man by man.” Even extended into culture, the state, and the city, this natural reason is the kind of reason for which one strives. The city is even the best environment in which a reasonable man can live, according to Spinoza; and this kind of reasoning is the reasoning a child should learn to become more joyful and more active.

Mowgli’s Jungle Reasoning

Although several film adaptations of Kipling’s stories of the Jungle Book, I refer only to the first filmed version, the one by Zoltan Korda (1942). What is remarkable in the first place is the film’s style. It is a film that evokes affects, not through the close-up of the affection-image, as with Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but through its color effects. Most of the shots are long or medium takes. A few close-ups are seen, especially of Mowgli’s head and the different animal heads, but they do not dominate the picture. The overall impression is of a colorful painting in beautiful Technicolor. In
this respect, Korda’s version is close to Disney’s animation film. Children love *Jungle Book* not only because a child, a boy, has the lead and not only because children are closer to the world and affects of animals; it is also because children react immediately to the sensations provoked by the colors. The question of realism is in no respect important to the direct effect of the events that we see. The leaves of the bushes are sometimes blue, the water seems like a painter’s palette with all the brightly colored water lilies, and the mostly (but not always) real animals run through studio settings that evoke the jungle but do not resemble it. The images are enchanting and exciting, full of a logic of sensations.

Out of this colorful palette of sensations derives a story told by a narrator: an old Indian beggar, who at the end turns out to be Boldeo, Mowgli’s human enemy in the village where he was born. As is well known, Mowgli was born of humans but raised by wolves. He learns the laws of the jungle (to which I will return) and learns how to move through the jungle. It is mainly his motor system, the way he moves lightly, and his athleticism (the way his body moves and rests, slows down, and speeds up), that shows he is in the state of becoming-animal. In relation to the other animals and in relation to the jungle, Mowgli develops intensive and extensive capacities that give him power.

In a different way, Bacon’s figures are also athletic; but, because Bacon’s figures cannot move, their athleticism cannot be translated into actual movement (jumping, crawling, swinging from liana to liana). Therefore, the athleticism is expressed in a sort of spastic position, which makes Bacon’s bodies appear to be struggling with their internal powers; they want to escape from their own bodies. Mowgli does not need to escape from his own body; he is not locked up in it because he has balanced his movements. Nevertheless, he has to escape from the jungle. Although he has many animal friends, Mowgli has one enemy: Shere Khane, the tiger, who chases him away.

It is in the confrontations between Mowgli and Shere Khane that we see the rare close-ups of the film. In the beginning of the film, we see Mowgli’s face, expressing fear, in medium close-up. The tiger’s head shows anger and aggression. Mowgli is in the position of a child; he has no power to turn his passive affections into active ones. During his stay with the humans, he grows up. At the moment when he gets “a tooth,” he is adult and sees the possibility of taking revenge. This “tooth” is a knife, but as a real
Spinozist, for Mowgli it makes no difference whether his tooth is organic (part of his body) or not. As long as he can defend himself with it and it gives him another (in this case, more powerful) dynamic, there is no difference between a knife and a tooth; each has a purely mechanical function. So Mogli can go back to the jungle for a new confrontation with Shere Khane. This time, the heads of both Mowgli and Shere Khane express anger and aggression, and Mowgli is successful in his revenge. Mowgli has learned to reason, which does not exclude him from nature.

In this respect, he is the opposite of the narrator, Boldeo, who started his story with these words: “What is the book of life itself but war with nature, the struggle between jungle and village?” Boldeo and most of the villagers have learned to reason only for their own benefit: they are greedy for what Mowgli calls worthless things (the treasures of the fallen city in the jungle). They kill for the game or the pride, not for food or defense (which is law number one in the jungle), and they do not take care of their interactions with other people (they mistrust everybody) or with their surroundings. This last aspect becomes hilariously clear in the sequence where Boldeo and two other villagers walk through the jungle dressed completely in the fine clothes they found with the treasures and carrying heavy bags of gold through the woods. They totally misfit the environment; indeed, two of them will not survive. Mowgli, on the other hand, has partly learned the reasoning of man. For instance, he has learned the language so that he can communicate with other humans. The scene where he is initiated in language is touchingly simple. Because he is able to make only wolf sounds, Mowgli’s (human) mother, who is not sure this wolf-boy is her son, says that he can call her mother. After a few repetitions, he can pronounce the word. Then she asks for his name. When he does not understand her, she makes the sound of a wolf. Apparently, she knows exactly how to speak this animal language because Mowgli understands her and answers her question by saying something that sounds like Mowgli (which means “little frog”).

We see here that both children and women are close to the animal world and to becoming-animal. The film does not show the learning process. The narrator just tells us that in a few months Mowgli “learns the ways, language and customs of men.” So it is not the learning process itself that is important but what one does with the acquired knowledge. Mowgli uses his knowledge to empower his natural forces: he buys a...
“tooth” and speaks with the wise snake, who advises him about how to lure Shere Khane to the water, where he can more easily master him. That is all he wants to learn from man because at the end of the film he decides to go back and stay in the jungle: “Man is idle, senseless and cruel. I am of the jungle; their trail is my trail, their fight is my fight,” Mowgli concludes, leaving humans behind with their own (non-Spinozian) reasoning.

The Taming of the Wild Child

Mowgli is not the only wolf-child. Both legends (“Romulus and Remus”) and true stories abound. Deleuze mentions a study about wolf-children by Schérer and Hocquenghem, which says that those children have not really become wolves. Neither is it true that wolf-children simply imitate the beasts that have raised them; nor is a metaphor in place. The researchers speak about an objective but indeterminate and uncertain zone of something the animal and the human have in common, an intensive proximity, that is actually visible in all children, as if each child has room for other becomings. A wolf-child is the reality of a becoming-animal without becoming an animal in reality. In 1969 François Truffaut filmed one of those true stories about wolf-children that took place in 1798 in the surroundings of Paris: L’Enfant Sauvage. Interestingly, this film is in many aspects the opposite of Korda’s Jungle Book.

First, let us look at the style of the film. Like in Korda’s film, there are few close-ups. Most of the shots take a considerable distance (medium or long shots), but this time there is no enchanting Technicolor to take care of the sensations and the affects. The images are in black and white (not a coloristic use of black and white, but the black and white of reasoning). This is not in contradiction to the content of the film, however, because this time the aim is not to show the becoming-animal and to let the law of the jungle prevail. This time, a “becoming-human” is the central focus: Doctor Itard (played by Truffaut himself) takes care of the education of a wild child who has been found in the forest. In the first part, until he is entrusted to Dr. Itard and his housekeeper, Madame Guerin, the child is a real wild child. As Schérer and Hocquenghem discovered, the child had not really become an animal, nor equally was he “stupid” or mentally less capable, like an animal (although this is presumed by some of his discoverers). Rather, the child has a way of moving and resting that comes somewhere close to the motoricity of animals. The film is divided into parts that are marked by one image that
is captured and isolated in an iris. Each part shows a stage in the development of the child. In the first stage, the child is wild.

Then he is brought to Paris, to a clinic for deaf and mute children. His movements are still close to those of an animal. In the clinic, he is examined: he has a normal human constitution, but he is covered with scars. One of the scars, on his throat, is not from an animal but from a knife: his mother or parents had wanted to get rid of him. The director of the clinic considers the wild child to be mentally diseased, which probably would have been why his parents abandoned him. Dr. Itard has a different opinion: he thinks the child was probably illegitimate and abandoned for that reason. He sees nothing wrong with the child except that he has lived for many years in complete solitude without any human contact: Itard understands that becoming-animal does not mean mental retardation but is a matter of external movements (longitude) and instinctual affects (latitude).

Itard can take the child with him. The first step to humanity is indeed learning how to walk and how to move as a human being, like the gestures one must make while eating. Note how close this is to all children’s learning process: they also have to learn to walk on two feet, to eat with a spoon, and such. At the same time, Dr. Itard works on the child’s other immanent axis: he tries to change his sensations so that he can approve emotions. Now the child smells at everything, is rather insensitive to cold or heat, and cannot cry or show any emotions. “I want to make him weaker, I want him to get less physical power, but more emotions,” says Itard. This is where humanity starts: a certain way of moving and sensations that can become emotions. In the next nine months, a “human is born.” The boy gets a name: Victor. He also gets a crash course in representation, the alphabet, reading, writing, speaking, memory training, a sense of justice, and behavior. All through the punishment–reward method, Itard is a man with a great sense of fairness: he sees that the boy would have been better off in the woods if he does not learn how to “survive” in the human world. Therefore, he has to learn the language, he has to understand what is right and wrong, he has to wear clothes, and he has to try to communicate with other people.

Itard is a severe but good teacher. Significantly, though, it is always Madame Guerin who takes care of comforting Victor when he breaks down (for instance, when he has to learn the alphabet), who hugs him and kisses him, and who speaks kindly to him. Except for his sense of justice,
all the emotions that are close to the initial affects are learned by the side of the housekeeper. Itard wants to turn Victor immediately into a man, a reasonable and sensible man (not like the Jungle Book villagers), because he knows what the norm is to survive as a man. This is a noble ambition and produces results; but looking at Victor’s face, one might wonder what he is thinking. He probably knows there are some limits and constraints (especially from the father and reason that excludes emotions or brings in false reasoning) to being human, which is probably why he flees back to the forest. After a few days, he discovers that in the meantime he has become too accustomed to his new environment: the four walls of a house and the company of other human beings. He has also become too weak for the forest. So he returns to the house and to his teacher (we see again the importance of the interaction between bodies and spaces). When he climbs the stairs, however, he looks at Dr. Itard with mixed emotions: partly grateful for his education and attention, partly suspicious about what is to come—rightly so because not all humans have the same fairness and reasoning to balance the laws of nature and culture as do Dr. Itard and Madame Guerin.

Passive and Active Affects

Suffering Flesh

Up to now I have looked at stories about the relation between humans and animals that have been told over and again. Those stories, as legends and myths, have cultural and philosophic value. Although their adaptations vary against the background of various historical changes, their basic assumptions remain the same: becoming-animal is seen as something monstrous unless a child is involved. A child can make a bridge between humans and animals because the natural motor system and instinctual reactions of children are closer to those of the world of animals. In the next section, I return to some recent variations on some of the old themes when I talk about the active power that the sensation of becoming-animal can provoke. First, I look at passive affects, which are also a possible part of the becoming-animal. As Deleuze states in his book on Bacon, in becoming-animal, human and animal enter in an affective relation of proximity: “A human who suffers is an animal, an animal that suffers is human. This is
the reality of becoming.”

I therefore revisit Fassbinder’s *In a Year of Thirteen Moons*, which I discussed in Chapter 2, and to the paintings of Bacon. When I saw Bacon’s crucifixion paintings (Triptych, *Three Studies for a Crucifixion*, 1962), I thought immediately of Fassbinder’s film. The choice of comparing this film with Bacon’s work thus is based on this instinctive sensation. I was moved in a similar way by both the painting and the film—hence my search for some reasoning about this initial affect. As a preliminary remark, I must say that this film is not part of a larger “mythology” around humans and animals, as are the films discussed previously in this chapter. Rather, it is a specific story at a specific moment with specific references to history. It is also the story of the creation of a specific BwO through a becoming-animal. In Chapter 2, I already discussed some of those specificities. Here I concentrate on everything that is related to becoming-animal. Fassbinder’s film works directly on the nervous system; it is full of the affect of becoming-animals. Not all becoming-animals are the same, however.

As indicated, the main character in *In a Year of Thirteen Moons* is the transsexual woman Elvira (formerly Erwin). Her becoming-animal certainly could be seen as a becoming-pet: a dog that is being beaten by its master(s), a child being beaten by its father (or mother). For Freud, masochism is part of sadomasochism; however, this need not always be the case. In his study on masochism, Deleuze finds another way of talking about masochism. He goes back to the literary sources that have given their name to these “basic perversions”: Marquis de Sade and Sacher-Masoch. Like a doctor giving his name to a disease for which he described a set of symptoms (like in the case of Parkinson disease), de Sade and Masoch provide the symptoms and essential characteristics of sadism and masochism. According to Deleuze, as soon as one reads Masoch, one finds that his (Masoch’s) universe has nothing to do with that of de Sade. They not only have different techniques but also very different problems and projects. This does not mean that some transformations between sadism and masochism are not possible. What Deleuze is arguing against is the sadomasochistic unity.

I want to raise two points about Deleuze’s study of Masoch. First, I must stress again that Deleuze does not deny that there can exist oedipal structures in human relations; but they are not always the basic and only

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relations between people, animals, or other things. Deleuze distinguishes three types of women in the universe of Masoch; these types correspond to three images of the mother: the primitive mother (the real “womb” mother), the *oedipal* mother (the lover), and the oral mother (the earth-mother, giving life and death). The oral mother plays the most important role in masochism, and I will return to the oral mother.

The second point about Deleuze’s interpretation of masochism concerns the principal masculine characters that Masoch distinguishes: Cain and Christ. Cain is the child preferred by the mother; he even commits a crime (killing his brother and breaking with his father) to make of Eve a mother–goddess. This crime is not a symbol of sadomasochism but belongs completely to the masochistic world. Christ also breaks the pact with his father (“Why hast thou forsaken me?”), and it is the mother who puts him on the cross. Like a real oral mother, says Deleuze, she assures the son of a resurrection like a second parthenogenetic birth.

If we look again at Bacon’s painting “Crucifixion” and relate this to Deleuze’s remark on masochism and the figure of Christ, masochism is related not only to crucifixion but also to becoming-animal. The slaughterhouse scene in *In a Year of Thirteen Moons*, which was the central image in the last section of Chapter 2, evokes the same sad affects as Bacon’s crucifixion paintings. One could read this scene metaphorically: the cows are slaughtered like Elvira is “slaughtered.” Right at the beginning, Elvira is beaten by two homosexuals who discover that she has no penis. When she comes home, she sinks onto the floor, bending her head down, like the crucified figure of Bacon’s painting. Right after that, she is beaten up again by her boyfriend Kristoff, who will then leave her. It was also noted earlier that in the video-arcade scene Elvira is insulted by one of the customers of the arcade, who tells her that he will slaughter her if she looks at him once more (“. . . und Ich schlachte dich ab!”). The slaughtered animals are not just a metaphor for Elvira’s condition.

Throughout the film, there are visual and discursive signs that point toward a real becoming-animal of Elvira. As argued before, almost all the close-ups in Fassbinder’s film are reserved for Elvira, expressing her sad affects. None of the other persons gets closer than medium-close, and if they are so close in the image, it is to express an affect that is similar to Elvira’s (for instance, Elvira’s friend Zora or the nun, Sister Gudrun). In the slaughterhouse, there is also a medium close-up of the head of a cow,
which has been skinned. Under it are not bones, but red flesh. “Pity the flesh,” says Deleuze about Bacon’s crucifixion paintings. The flesh in his paintings is not dead flesh but still contains all the sufferings and the colors of life (red blood). Bacon is not saying, “Pity the animals”; rather, he is saying that every man who suffers is “fleshy,” and the flesh is the indiscernible zone between humans and animals. Bacon himself comments, “I have always been very touched by images that are related to the slaughterhouse and to the flesh, and for me they are all strongly connected to the crucifixion. . . . It’s certain that we are powerful carcasses. When I go to a butcher shop, I am always surprised not to be there, in the place of the animal. . . .” 39 So it is in the flesh that the becoming-animal of humans finds its expression.

In the flesh, humans become animal, the body becomes a figure, and the face becomes a head. In this way, the close-ups of Elvira’s face gain something akin to a “head-like” quality, which expresses passive affects. This effect is reinforced by Fassbinder’s frequent and dominant use of red and blue light, which gives some scenes a painterly quality (in contrast to other scenes filmed in harsh realistic light). Bacon also uses a lot of red and blue for his crucifixion paintings. Not only on the image-track of In a Year of Thirteen Moons are there numerous references to the becoming-animal of the flesh; the soundtrack, too, includes many references to the flesh. Elvira’s head and body are rather “fleshy.” We can see that, but more often we are told that she is. For instance, Kristoff, who forces Elvira to look at her face in the mirror (“Ekelhaft,” he shouts) and then throws her on the bed in disgust: “All dieses überflüssiges Fleisch!—Weil du keinen Willen hast, du bist nur passiv.” 40

Here flesh is here associated with passiveness (passive affects), which is one kind of becoming-animal. Anton Saitz, the man for whom Erwin had himself operated into Elvira (taking away some “superfluous flesh”?), was a “meat dealer” (Er handelte in Fleisch). When Elvira visits him after many years, one of the first remarks he makes about her is that she has become fat. Finally, there are a few remarks about mothers who try to “stuff” their children: Erwin as a child was stuffed with food by the nuns in the nunnery; so they did not see “the happy child becoming a sad child.” and Elvira’s ex-wife insists that their daughter Marianne should eat. “All right then, for your sake, I’ll get as round as a ball,” the girl replies. 41 This is where the oral mother enters the masochistic scene again: the fattened child
becomes dependent and passive and eventually returns to mother earth what it has taken: the cycle of becoming-human and becoming-animal.

Finally, I want to remark on three instances where Fassbinder uses “disembodied” voices. These disembodied voices have, in the first instance, a narrative function, namely, to narrate Elvira’s life story. This first happens in the slaughterhouse scene. Although we know that Elvira is in the slaughterhouse of which we see the images (so the voice is not completely disembodied), her voice sounds far away, as if it has escaped from her body and is now floating around trying to find that body again. In combination with the screaming voice at a certain moment and the images of the poor, bloody, and fleshy cows, this scene expresses exactly the same as Bacon’s crucifixion painting, discussed previously. The scream painted by Bacon is now displaced to the soundtrack; it is “glued” against the images of the descending flesh of the animals. It is almost too sad to endure watching and listening. So a second function of the disembodiment of the voice is to give it a “painterly” effect/affect.

Another half-disembodied voice in the film is the voice of Sister Gudrun (played by Fassbinder’s mother), who speaks about Erwin’s youth. Again, the voice sounds like a voice-over: the body is actually in the image but seems nevertheless absent from that voice. In this way, we learn that Erwin is a bastard child, and his real mother did not want her husband to find out about his existence, which meant that the child could never have any foster parents either. His “primitive mother” threw him away; his “oral mothers” (the nuns) first made him a fatty, and then they also took their distance. Actually, Elvira is like the wolf-children that are abandoned by their real mother and raised by surrogate mothers. Only nuns are not wolves, and instead of developing a sense for active affects, Elvira has developed a sense for passive affects. Finally, Erwin tries himself to become an “oedipal mother,” a mistress for her “father” (Anton, Kristoff), all related to becoming-animal and masochism. Actually, the whole film is a tour of all Masoch’s mothers; when the tour is finished, Elvira commits suicide, which is the final spasm of the body (comparable to Bacon’s paintings).

The last disembodied voice is then Elvira’s voice again, this time recorded on tape for an interview in a magazine. Again, this is a reflection on her life, which is heard while her dead body is discovered. Not all the words can be discerned because the scene goes on, and other people enter the house, talk, and cry while Elvira’s recorded voice continues. One of the
things that can be heard is that she was not sure she wanted to die. “Maybe there were still a few words that played a role: consolation, (melancholic) desire and maybe I wanted to live those ideas,” is one of the last sentences. Bitterly, we may conclude that consolation and desire were now worn out, completely consumed, and there was nothing left to live for anymore. Fassbinder’s *In a Year of Thirteen Moons* is a sad, bloody, and cruel film. Through the camerawork and the colors, through the dialogues and monologues, and through the very effective use of the soundtrack, the film evokes strong sensations that are similar to the sensations evoked by Bacon’s paintings. Passivity, pity, and sorrow are the affects attained by experiencing this kind of BwO in becoming-animal.

*Contamination: The Pack of Animals*

Besides passive affects, there are also a possibility and wish for active affects. Cows, pigs, and sheep in general are led more by passive affects than, for instance, wolves. A human being that is more inclined to active affects (it is clear that transformations from passive to active are possible and even necessary for the persistence of being) will likely become an active animal. In this section, I look at such becoming-animal. As I already said, stories and myths about wolves and werewolves have a long tradition and easily could be read as metaphoric or archetypical. Nevertheless, I think stories about werewolves are more than that, especially in some modern adaptations, such as Neil Jordan’s film *The Company of Wolves* (1984) and Mike Nichols’ *Wolf* (1994). Wolves are wild, flesh-eating animals of the dog family, which hunt in packs. The “flesh-eating” indicates the active (and dangerously wild) part of the wolf. This could be seen as the sadistic pendant of the passive masochistic affects just discussed. It will become clear, however, that a completely different economy at stake.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-animal has always involved “a pack, a gang, a population, a peopling, in short multiplicity. We sorcerers have always known that.”42 Animals are fundamentally a band, a pack, say Deleuze and Guattari. Hence, a becoming-animal should entail the multiplicity of the pack. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the problem with Freud is precisely that he does not recognize this multiplicity. In “One or Several Wolves” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, they comment on Freud’s Wolf-Man, demonstrating how Freud manages to make the singular from the multiple. Although Freud had just discovered that the unconscious often has
to do with multiplicities, he nevertheless reduces the dreams of the wolfman to the father. Because they put it so eloquently, I quote the passage where they describe Freud’s free association on the level of representation:

The wolves will have to be purged of their multiplicity. This operation is accomplished by associating the dream with the tale, “The Wolf and the Seven Kid-Goats” (only six of which get eaten). We witness Freud’s reductive glee; we literally see multiplicity leave the wolves to take the shape of goats that have absolutely nothing to do with the story. Six wolves: the seventh goat (the wolf man himself) is hiding in the clock. Five wolves: he may have seen his parents make love at five o’clock, and the roman numeral V is associated with the erotic spreading of a woman’s legs. Three wolves: the parents may have made love three times. Two wolves: the first coupling the child may have seen was the two parents more ferarum, or perhaps even two dogs. One wolf: the wolf is the father, as we all knew from the start. Zero wolves: he lost his tail, he is not just a castrator but also castrated. Who is Freud trying to fool? The wolves never had a chance to get away and save their pack: it was already decided from the beginning that animals could serve only to represent coitus between the parents or, conversely, be represented by coitus between parents.43

The fact that goats have nothing to do with this story about wolves indicates again the incorrectness of equating masochism to sadism: as noted before, they have their own economies. Deleuze and Guattari see the association of the wolf with goats and then finally with the father as an insult to the wolves and to the fascination of becoming-wolf. As we already learned from Mowgli, children understand more of this fascination than adults; but from the previous chapter, it is also clear that some women, too, at least when they are open to a becoming-woman, are closer to the understanding of this kind of becoming-animal.44

Angela Carter is known for her rewriting of myths and fairy tales in which she shows a deep insight into the real fascinations for real becomings. The Company of Wolves is one of those rewritten stories. She also collaborated on the script of the film that Neil Jordan made from her stories about wolves.45 As with all the previous analyses, I concentrate on the film. Jordan made of Carter’s short story a film with a complex mise-en-abîme structure: there is a girl dreaming; there is the visualization of her dream, and within that dream several stories are told that are also visualized. I do not want concentrate on this narrative structure, although it indicates different levels of “reality.” The connecting thread of the film is the tale of
“Little Red Riding Hood.” According to the rereading of this tale by the psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim, the red cape symbolizes her first menstrual blood, the wolf being the dangers of sexual intercourse and the forester being the father, who restores law, order, and innocence, liberating both Riding Hood and her grandmother and killing the wolf. Carter’s rewriting of “Little Red Riding Hood” contains some elements of Bettelheim’s interpretation. In the first instance, Little Red Hiding Hood is the story of the little girl who becomes a woman. Jordan emphasizes this association of the color red, menstrual blood, and sexuality on all levels of the narrative by giving the dreaming girl shining red lips and in the dream indeed a very large red cape, knitted by her grandmother.

The Company of Wolves is not only about becoming a woman in the traditional (psychoanalytic) sense. It is also about becoming-animal by first becoming-woman (Riding Hood is not for nothing a girl, another modern Alice). First, Carter (and with her, Jordan) understands that wolves operate in packs. When we see one wolf, there will soon be two wolves, three wolves, ten wolves, many wolves. When Riding Hood, whose name is Rosaleen in the film, is alone with her wolf-man in the last scene of the film, they suddenly hear the howling of a multitude of wolves: “These are the voices of my brothers, darling,” says the wolf-man, “I love the company of wolves.” Rosaleen, very pragmatically (“Being afraid wouldn’t do me much good, would it?”), is not scared. She is a bit suspicious because her grandmother told her so much idle gossip about werewolves; so she grabs a gun to defend herself. At the same time, she senses that there is something exciting to discover here. Earlier in the film, Rosaleen has witnessed a Freudian scene: she saw and heard her parents making love. Instead of being traumatized, however, she is fascinated and curious. The next morning (when she sees her mother happy and alive working in the house), she asks her mother if he (daddy) hurts her. Rosaleen has a wise mother, who does not give her a slap in the face for such an impolite question, but asks her why she thinks he would hurt her. “Because it sounds like the beast granny told about,” answers Rosaleen. Rosaleen’s mother replies to this that she should not listen so much to granny’s stories and that “if there is a beast in man, it meets its match in woman too.” A very wise mother indeed, who demythologizes all (Freudian) binarism between man and woman and who gives her daughter instead a knife to defend herself if necessary and trusts her to make...
her own judgments about the affinities she has and the alliances she wants to make.

The knife is because not all men/animals match with all women. One must find the one that can make the alliance (but this is a different “one” than the Freudian “One”). As Deleuze and Guattari put it: “Wherever there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made in order to become-animal. There may be no such thing as a lone wolf, but there is a leader of the pack.”

Rosaleen is the exceptional human who can establish this alliance, but she in turn is also looking for the exceptional animal who can show her this unknown territory of becoming-animal. In the film, Rosaleen has a little neighbor who is clearly in love with her, but she does not want him. She likes him quite well, but he is a rustic clown to her, a playmate, nothing more. In the woods (having left the only safe track), she meets a “fine fellow” to whom she feels immediately attracted, even though she senses that he might be a (were)wolf. This is the “exceptional individual” with whom she can make alliance. Finally, she will burn the symbolic red cape.

Carter’s story ends with the girl sleeping in granny’s bed (granny is dead and remains dead) between the paws of the tender wolf. Jordan goes one step further. As Laura Mulvey puts it in her essay on Angela Carter, “In The Company of Wolves Rosaleen comes to terms with the wolf inside the charming hunter, in such a way as to suggest that she is accepting not so much the bestiality of men as the presence of her now recognized, but unpressed sexuality.” In the film, Rosaleen actually becomes a wolf, and before her father can shoot her (like the forester in the fairy tale), her mother sees that the wolf is wearing Rosaleen’s necklace and prevents him from doing so. The wise mother has seen that her daughter has chosen to become-wolf and lets her go to seek the company of wolves. The last images of the dream are of one wolf (Rosaleen) who joins another (her “prince of darkness”), who joins many others (the pack). Carter and Jordan have transformed a metaphoric myth into a fairy tale of becoming-animal.

It is clear that the becoming-animal as just described has nothing to do with the passive affects and becoming-flesh/meat of Bacon. Becoming-wolf has everything to do with active affects. In The Company of Wolves, this activity was always already a part of Rosaleen; she just had to continue
Logic of Sensations in Becoming-Animal

on her path of becoming. Another possibility is the transformation of passive affects into active ones. This is clearly the case in the film Wolf. Will Randall works at a publishing house that is going to merge. At the beginning of the film, Randall is a tired, passive man who is not able to stop the games that are being played with him. He is given a choice either to quit or to be transferred to Eastern Europe (which in this case boils down to the same thing). At the beginning of the film, when he is stuck near the border of a forest (the border zone where, according to Deleuze and Guattari, alliances get made), he is bitten by a wolf and slowly he senses that something of the spirit of the wolf is becoming part of him. He feels “reborn” and starts to fight back. Slowly, he discovers that he is really becoming a wolf, with all the negative (murderous) consequences as well.

First, it should be noted that Randall, although he seems passive and is overruled all the time, is “exceptional.” This becomes clear at a publisher’s party, where he does not conform to the rules of polite conversation. When his boss announces to him news of his transfer, he says that “taste and personality” (Randall’s qualities) are not the right qualities to have in the publishing business. His boss’s daughter Laura is also an outcast. She hates her father’s business and does not feel at home at the party. In this respect, she matches Randall perfectly, and it is no coincidence that they meet. We see here again two exceptional beings who will make the alliance.

Second, this alliance is not something hereditary but something that is contagious (as was already remarked about vampires as well). This contamination (for instance, by a bite) is typical of the notion of becoming in general, particularly of the becoming-animal. The difference between contagion and inheritance is that it can connect very heterogeneous elements, such as a human and an animal. It is worthwhile to note how this alliance is related to Donna Haraway’s concept of affinity, which characterizes the relations of the cyborg: “Affinity: related not by blood but by choice, the appeal of one chemical nuclear group for another.” Although Randall apparently has not chosen to be bitten by a wolf, he has something in him on the plane of immanence that chooses to be inspired by the spirit of the wolf. Laura, however, will at the very end of the film clearly make a choice to become-wolf. In that sense, she is comparable to Rosaleen.

This brings me to the second way of contamination: sexuality (which was also clear in The Company of Wolves). Sexuality has the power of alliance, say Deleuze and Guattari. Both Rosaleen and Laura become-wolf.
through sexual alliance, which they consider not a threat but a liberation. As in *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*, it is interesting to see that this alliance, this becoming-animal, is expressed again in the image by close-ups and extreme close-ups of the eyes. In the last image, we see the eyes of Randall-wolf in extreme close-up. Then we see Laura walking alone (but certainly not afraid) in the woods. The next moment, we see her eyes slowly conflating with the wolf’s eyes. In this way, the (spatial and other) difference between man, woman, and animal is dissolved and the becoming-animal has become real. Just before that moment, Laura’s becoming-animal also was rendered in a different way. Like Randall before, she exhibited an extremely well-developed sense of smell: from a great distance, she can smell that the police inspector had been drinking vodka and tonic. The improvement of the senses (all senses or at least other senses than the normal human ones) is the first sign of becoming-animal.

This relates to the third remark I would like to make about *Wolf*. It is through a better development of the senses that Randall first becomes aware of his changing spirit. It is through the senses that he can change his passive affects into active affects. Randall discovers that he can smell things he could never smell before, that he can hear through the walls of his office, and that he can suddenly read without glasses; he notices that something inside of him is changing (and again these sensations are shown in close-up). His movements also change. First, he becomes very active sexually, but after a while, he can also jump like an animal. In short, it is his “longitude,” his movements and rests, that also change his “latitude” axis. Randall’s change of perception (through all the senses) is similar to the effects of drugs. Also, in this respect, there is a proximity between Mr. Hyde and Randall-becoming-wolf: they feel like they have taken a drug. In the plateau on becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari dedicate several pages to the effects of drugs. They state that drugs change movement and perception:

All drugs fundamentally concern speeds, and modifications of speed. What allows us to describe an overall Drug assemblage in spite of the differences between drugs is a line of perceptive causality that makes it so that (i) the imperceptible is perceived; (2) perception is molecular; (3) desire directly invests the perception and the perceived. . . . It is our belief that the issue of drugs can be understood only at the level where desire directly invests perception, and perception becomes molecular at the same time as the imperceptible is perceived. Drugs then appear as the
agent of becoming. . . . The unconscious as such is given in microperceptions. . . . Drugs give the unconscious the immanence and plane that psychoanalysis has consistently botched.51

What happens to Randall is like a drug effect: he perceives what he can normally not perceive; it is as if he can see through people, as if he can look at his own plane of immanence and understand what and who is important for him and how he can reach this and them.

With their elaborations on drugs, Deleuze and Guattari do not want to romanticize drugs (a reproach they often received) or want to make us all junkies. The great danger of drugs is that, instead of giving you more power and rapidity in movement and perception, they make you no longer master of movements and perceptions. The “black hole” of addiction leads to destruction instead of enrichment of one’s life. According to Deleuze and Guattari, we should arrive at a point where the question is no longer “to take drugs or not to take them” (I paraphrase) but rather that the drug has changed the general conditions of perception to such an extent that also without drugs we reach the plane of immanence: in order not to be fooled by the drugs, the aim is to become “drugged” by water, by music, by anything but drugs. Randall has not taken drugs, but the effects are the same. In the end, however, he is not destroyed; he has found his line of flight by becoming-animal, as will his matching alliance Laura.

**New Experiments—New Images—New “Manimals”**

Despite all the intrinsic dangers of all kinds of becoming, of all kinds of rhizomatic experiences, Deleuze and Guattari nevertheless advocate experimenting: “Make a rhizome. But you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with, you don’t know which subterranean stem is effectively going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, people your desert. So experiment.”52

As is clear from the foregoing, certain kinds of becoming-animal always have already played a role in human imagination, in mythology and fairy tales. Since the modernization of science, certainly since the nineteenth century, these becomings have become more specific and more related to scientific experiments. Often these experiments still have been rooted in archetypical and binary models of thinking: Dr. Frankenstein, Dr. Moreau, Dr. Jekyll, they all suffer from it and provide us with our
traditional monsters. In the twentieth century, science developed enormously and is changing our perception on all levels. Slowly but surely, some new perceptions are becoming possible. Many experiments are ongoing, and although they do not always have happy endings, these are developments we cannot stop. Some recent films show experiments that try to change our perception, which also implies that we leave the “familiar” becoming-animals (be they passive or active), our familiar monsters, and step into the unknown zones between human and insect, human and ram, and human and kangaroo. In other words, we are entering a cyborg world of techno-teratologic imaginations.

If there is one filmmaker who has always shown an interest in experimenting with the possibilities of new science, it is David Cronenberg. Perhaps by now not surprisingly, his colleague and friend Martin Scorsese compared Cronenberg’s work with the paintings of Francis Bacon. Although Cronenberg has made several films that show becoming-animals, for example, Shivers (1975), Rabid (1976), and, of course, The Fly (1986), on which I concentrate in this section, his films show a very different becoming-animal from Fassbinder’s In a Year of Thirteen Moons, which was close to Bacon’s paintings. Unlike Fassbinder’s, Cronenberg’s films always have been associated with the horror genre, but the way he films the horror of becoming is how he is close to Bacon. This actually means they do not so much show the horror as visible spectacle. Rather, they show the horror of invisible forces that come from inside. Bacon himself refers to this as “painting the cry, more than painting horror.” Seth Brundle’s gradual discovery of becoming-fly is a cry of not being able to control invisible forces. There is no literal crying and screaming, as in traditional horror films. Like Bacon, he could paint the cry in one static moment, and Cronenberg films it in the duration of the becoming.

In The Fly, Seth Brundle, who is again a scientist who has isolated himself to dedicate his passion to science, has discovered a machine for teletransportation. This teletransportation (in itself also an old fantasy) can be achieved by means of molecular breakdown and recreation. Very directly, this indicates the molecular level on which all becomings take place and on which the becoming-fly specifically is situated. When Seth shows his invention for the first time to journalist Veronica, the machine still does not know how to teletransport living material. Seth discovers that this is because he (and therefore the computer that is programmed by him) does

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not understand enough about “the flesh.” This discovery is mediated by one of the most “fleshy” experiences human beings can have, namely, making love (again the importance of sexuality is emphasized). It is Veronica who gives him the understanding of the flesh when she says after making love that she would like to eat him: “Now I understand why grannies like to pinch baby-cheeks: the flesh makes them crazy.”

Like for Bacon and Fassbinder, the flesh is important; but before Cronenberg shows how the flesh degenerates, he shows how “new flesh” is created:

The most accessible version of the new flesh would be that you can actually change what it means to be a human being in a physical way. We have certainly changed in a psychological way since the beginning of mankind. And we have in fact changed in a physical way as well. We are different physically from our forefathers, partly because of what we take into our bodies and partly because of things like glasses and surgery and so on. But there is a further step that could happen, which would be that you could grow another arm, that you could actually physically change the way you look, mutate, all of these things.

In the next passage of the interview with Cronenberg from which these words are taken, Cronenberg also stresses the importance of sexuality and the wish to “swap organs” or “develop different kinds of organs” or “have no (sexual) organs per se” to diminish sexual polarity. For *The Fly*, the polarity between human and insectile “organs” is diminished. The Fly presents us a BwO.

As soon as Brundle manages to keep the flesh in teletransportation (again a diminisher of distances between bodies and spaces), he is able to transport living beings. After a baboon comes out alive, Seth experiments on himself. Unfortunately, he does not act carefully enough (he is drunk and sad) and does not notice that a fly is transported with him and that on a genetic and molecular level (DNA) their bodies are combined; so Seth is becoming-insect. In the beginning, this has a positive effect on him. Like Randall in *Wolf*, Seth feels strong, liberated, and powerful with a lot of physical energy. Both his bodily movements and his perceptions change. There is an interesting shot in the film that shows Brundle’s studio seen from above. It turns out to be the point-of-view shot of Seth who, like a fly, is hanging on the ceiling and looking down on the world below. This is clearly a literal change of perception, which was anticipated by the very first image of the film, which is also a shot from above the scene in which...
Seth and Veronica meet each other at a reception. This crane shot, or bird’s-eye view, is an “inhuman” perception that is made possible by technology. Cinema in this respect is also a “machine of becoming.”

Like Randall, Brundle has experiences that are similar to taking drugs. Brundle even thinks he has discovered the “pure drug” (the drug without being a drug) as promoted by Deleuze and Guattari. Unfortunately, Brundle becomes a “junkie” nevertheless; he feels great and strong but starts looking worse and worse. He eats only chocolate and ice cream (“junkfood”); he no longer bothers about his bodily and spatial hygiene (degeneration); he wants to teletransport himself over and over again (addiction); and he also wants to transmit his experience to other people (contamination). Cronenberg himself acknowledges that creating new flesh is a risky business, which he compares to drug addiction: “It’s dangerous. You think you know what is going on, ... but you’re never really sure what you’re going to get out of it. I suppose it’s like taking a drug. You’ve heard that this drug is addictive. You think that you are not an addictive personality. You will try this drug, but you don’t really know what will happen. You don’t know that you will not end up like everybody else or worse, or will you? I mean you just don’t know.”57 In the same way, Seth did not know what would happen if he teletransported himself. He did not send the transported baboon to the laboratory for a check-up, and he did not take enough precautions. Even if he had done so, he would not have known what would happen. In this case, the experiment fails in a terrible way. Seth cannot accept his becoming-fly because he loses control of all his movements and actions.58 This desperate feeling of losing control is the cry we see. In his last desperate teletransportation, he fuses with the telepod machine itself, and even then the thing (“Brundlefly machine”) expresses a cry. The new flesh cannot contain all the explosions that take place on the level of immanence; one could say that Brundlefly dies of an overdose of transformation.

Luckily, not all experimentations go wrong (Deleuze and Guattari’s only advice is to be cautious in experimenting). The world of bizarre creatures that is created by fine artist Matthew Barney in his video film and related exhibition with sculptures, objects, and photos in Cremaster 4 (1994) could be seen as an aesthetic experiment that nevertheless is inspired by becoming of all sorts. In this project, Barney is the “Loughton man,” who combines human with Loughton ram characteristics. Throughout his
work, he has created many BwOs, bodies that make connections that defy many borders. His fascination for the American football player Jim Otto, who has a plastic knee, is significant in this respect. Also, the magician Harry Houdini is important for him. Actually, Barney himself is a magician (or a sorcerer, as Deleuze and Guattari say in their piece on becoming-animal) who transforms his models into fauns (Drawing Restraint 7, 1993), androgynous Graces, or race-car drivers whose leather race suits seem to be penetrated by a slimy substance (the first time, except in horror cinema, that the male body is associated with soft and stringy matter—it is not even flesh). In his latest work from the Cremaster series, Cremaster 5 (1997, shot on film) Barney himself is indeed announced as a magician. His world is so incredibly strange and beautiful that he stretches the limits of imagination and the limits of the body. In any case, Matthew Barney wants to free the body from its organic constraints. Like in popular culture, in visual arts, more and more expressions of becomings can be observed.

The last “successful experiment” that I want to mention here is Rachel Talalay’s film Tank Girl (1995). Here the new image of women (strong, tough, and not innocent, without fear and needy for connections, in short a cyborg) is related to a new sort of “manimals.” These creatures are the result of a DNA experiment that combined the genes of humans with those of kangaroos. Tank Girl and her friend Jet Girl first have prejudices about these creatures. Like everybody, they think that the Rippers are demonic monsters; however, they turn out to be gentle and democratic (!) and to possess a great sense of natural justice (the law of the jungle). Tank Girl is a sign of the times, showing in a funny and inventive way the fears and hopes of a young generation that will soon be entering the third millennium. The biggest fear, of course, is an ecologic disaster and that a small group of people will make a profit from it. The events in the film take place in 2033, a time by which the earth has changed into a desert and the little water that remains is appropriated by the Department of Water and Power, ruled by a truly sadistic dictator. It is a 1984-ish nightmare situation; but whereas Big Brother kept watching you, and no escape was possible, this time there is hope for revolution, transformation, and change. This hope comes from the margins, the little parts that are not kept by the system, either literally (like the Rippers, who have their own underground hiding places) or figuratively (like Tank Girl’s indestructible fighting spirit for freedom). From this very small group, the war with the system starts:
the war machine or the line of flight. As Deleuze and Guattari explained, the war machine never starts within a state; it always enters from the outside. I will not elaborate on that aspect of the film here, but this possibility of a war machine is certainly part of the utopian side of this film and world vision. The other aspect that is utopian relates to the acceptance of the manimals as complete and respect-worthy beings. Both Tank Girl and the Rippers are cyborgs in the way that Donna Haraway intended them: inappropriate/d others that embody the “promise of monsters” that might change the maps of the world. One might say that this is all fiction and fantasy and nonsense, but this would be a misunderstanding of the world we live in today: “Tank Girls” exist; DNA research is undergoing incredible development, and ecologic disasters are hanging like “swords of Damocles” above the earth.64

There is one other aspect in which this film relates to contemporary culture: music. The film’s soundtrack is composed in the spirit of MTV.65 In one scene, the kangaroo-men dance wildly to this music, which for them is a religious dance for the freedom of living and thinking. I think these creatures, which are in a real and permanent state of becoming, are proposing an ethics in the spirit of Spinoza. If he had been alive today, he would have joined the Rippers in their dance. Now they are joined by Tank Girl and Jet Girl. From becoming-animal, they are becoming-music, which is explored more extensively in the next chapter. Concerning the concept of the subject, it is now possible to conclude that its borders have become extremely flexible. In recognizing a zone of proximity between human subject and animals, becomings-animal are finding their own consistencies in various images and practices. Becoming-animal is one of the many possible becomings that open the subject to the invisible forces that can cause powerful effects and affects of change. Becoming-animal and other forms of (techno)mutations seen as a “philosophical teratology” then no longer need be regarded as a threat to humanity but as new ways of increasing powers and affects. Like in X-Men, the struggle then is no longer between humans and animals/monsters, but between all kinds of new forces that can be destructive as well as empowering.